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bancario para analizar los efectos de la concentración de mercado so- ; 
bre la toma de riesgo de los bancos. Mostramos que, cuando los de-
positantes están completamente asegurados, un mayor nivel de com-
petencia induce a los bancos a invertir en activos riesgosos. Cuando 
la concentración de mercado es alta los bancos tienden a tomar menos 
riesgo. Mostramos además, que el bienestar social es maximizado, ya ¡ 
sea a través de una entrada libre o de una restricción a la entrada. 
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analyze the effects of market concentration on the risk-taking behavior 
of banks. We show that, under full deposit insurance, a higher level of 
competition induces banks to invest in a risky asset. When the market 
concentration is high banks tend to take less risk. We also show that 
maximum social welfare is achieved either through free entry or through 
entry restriction. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past decades, the world economy has witnessed several banking 
crises. Banks' investment in risky assets are often viewed as one of 
the principal causes of bank failures. Banking crises are important to 
analyze not just because of the devastation they bring to one particu-
lar sector of the economy, but because they typically affect the entire 
economy. 
Banks raise deposits to invest by offering deposit rates. Exces-
sive deposits could induce banks to invest in more risky assets. Most 
of the central banks, following the recommendations of the BIS (Bank 
for International Settlements),
1 take various regulatory measures to 
discourage banks from investing in risky assets. There are some popu-
lar measures in practice. First, a minimum capital requirement which 
obliges the banks to include in their investments a minimum amount 
of their own capital (often it is a specific percentage of the total de-
posit invested). Second, a deposit rate ceiling, which imposes a max-
imum limit to the deposit rates offered by the banks. This is used to 
combat the negative effects of the financial liberalization (where there 
is no control on the deposit rates). Financial liberalization increases 
competition, provoking high deposit rates, and in consequence, lower 
profits which imply more incentives to gamble. Hellmann, Murdock 
and Stiglitz (2000) show that a Pareto efficient regulatory policy can 
only be implemented through a combination of minimum capital re-
quirements and deposit rate ceilings. Furthermore, the central banks 
provide deposit insurance to protect depositors in the case the bank 
where they have deposited their capital fails. 
The principal objective of this paper is to analyze the influence 
of market concentration on the banks' risk taking behavior under a 
regime of deposit insurance. We model a banking sector that consists 
of a finite number of banks. Banks compete in deposit rates to at-
tract depositors. Banks can invest either in a prudent asset or in a 
gambling asset. Investment in either asset is subject to a minimum 
capital requirement. The prudent asset yields a higher expected re-
turn compared to the gambling asset, but if the gamble succeeds it 
pays off a higher private return. There is a continuum of depositors 
with a unit of monetary fund apiece. These individuals can choose 
to deposit their money in a bank which pays off a return in the next 
period. They also incur a per unit transport cost in order to travel to 
a bank. We assume that depositors are completely insured, i.e., they 
certainly receive the deposit rates that they were promised. 
1 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001). MARKET POWER 57 
As our objective is to study the effects of market concentration 
on risk-taking, we use a model of monopolistic competition in the 
banking sector a la Salop (1979) where the space is a unit circle on 
which banks and depositors are uniformly distributed. Market power 
stems from the transport cost. The transport cost should not be 
interpreted just as the cost or time spent in traveling to a bank. 
Banks are differentiated because they provide different combinations 
of services to their customers such as credit facilities, availability in 
foreign countries, number of ATM's, internet banking, etc. 
We look at a symmetric Nash equilibrium. By symmetry we 
mean an equilibrium where banks offer identical deposit rates. We an-
alyze two types of equilibria. A prudent equilibrium where all banks 
invest in the prudent asset and a gambling equilibrium, where all 
banks invest in the gambling asset. Two types of market structures 
can occur. When the equilibrium deposit rate is high enough to com-
pensate all potential depositors for the transport cost, all of them 
place their funds, and we say that the market is covered. On the 
other hand, when the rate is not high enough to compensate for such 
costs, there are individuals who do not deposit their funds, and an un-
covered market is said to arise. We use the unit transport cost relative 
to the number of banks as a measure of market concentration. 
We show that when concentration is low, banks compete aggres-
sively to obtain a greater market share by offering high deposit rates 
which results in a covered market where all depositors place their 
funds. Due to the low profits generated by competition, all banks 
invest in the gambling asset. Then a Covered Gambling Equilibrium 
exists. For high levels of concentration, banks never gamble because 
they want to preserve the high profits derived from greater market 
power and there exists only a Covered Prudent Equilibrium. For even 
higher levels of market concentration, an uncovered market arises, 
where the deposit rates are so low that they do not compensate for 
the cost of traveling to a bank and some depositors decide to stay 
out of the market. Dam and Sanchez (2004) and Repullo (2004) use 
models a la Salop(1979), and show that high competition makes to 
banks invest in the gambling asset. Keeley (1990) uses an empirical 
model to show that banks tend to invest more in prudent assets as 
they gain market power. 
Banks invest in the gambling asset because, due to limited lia-
bility, if they fail, they are not obliged to pay back their depositors. 
This generates a moral hazard at the bank level. In a model without 
deposit insurance, the depositors' decision is influenced by the banks 
portfolio choice. In the current model, we assume that depositors 58 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
are completely insured. This assumption make depositors indifferent, 
worsening the moral hazard problem. Demirgiic-Kunt and Detra-
giache (1998) find empirical evidence that deposit insurance system 
has provoked banking crises in several countries. 
Next, we analyze a welfare maximization problem. Depending 
on the parameter values, maximum welfare can be achieved either 
through free entry or through an entry restriction. In the free entry 
case, the economy is stuck in a gambling equilibrium. The expected 
social loss from speculation is compensated by a higher deposit rate 
offered by the banks, thereby increasing consumers' surplus. In the 
entry restriction case, welfare is maximized for the level of market con-
centration where gambling is completely eliminated at equilibrium. 
This is consistent with the "last bank standing effect" observed by 
Perotti and Suarez (2002) who show that, in the presence of this effect 
(surviving banks may profit, at least temporarily, from their competi-
tors' failure), the existence of mergers and regulatory policies could 
lead to greater efficiency because they create certain market power 
that gives incentives to the solvent banks to invest in prudent assets. 
In our model, we use regulations on entry (a fixed entry/permanence 
quota) as a mechanism to create market power. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we 
describe the basic model. We analyze prudent and gambling equilibria 
and characterize the equilibrium in section 3. In the following section, 
we analyze the problem of welfare maximization. We conclude in 
section 5. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. 
2. The Model 
Consider a banking sector with n risk neutral banks who are uniformly 
distributed on a unit circle. Banks compete in deposit rates in order 
to attract depositors. Let r = {ru ru r„) be the deposit rates 
offered by the banks. We denote the demand for deposits of bank i as 
D{n, r_i), where r_4 is the vector of rates offered by all other banks. 
There is a continuum of depositors uniformly distributed on the 
circle. Each depositor has a unit fund which he can deposit in a bank 
and earn a deposit rate next period. It is worth noting that if an 
individual deposits 1 dollar in bank i then he gets back n. Hence, we 
assume that ri > 1 which is the interest payment plus his deposit of a 
dollar. The depositors incur a per unit cost t for traveling to a bank. 
We use the transport cost relative to the number of banks (t/n) as 
a measure of market concentration. It is appropriate because if the MARKET POWER 59 
transport cost relative to the number of banks is very high, given the 
total number of depositors, each bank can exercise its market power 
by reducing the deposit rate. 
Banks invest their total capital in assets. Banks are subject to 
a minimum capital requirement of k per cent. A bank can choose 
to invest in a prudent asset or in a gambling asset.
2 If a bank de-
cides to invest in the prudent asset, it receives a and if it decides 
to invest in the gambling asset, it obtains 7 with probability ± and 
zero with probability 5. We assume that the prudent asset has a 
hieher expected return (a > but if the gamble succeeds it Davs a 
higher return compared to the prudent asset (7 > a). We also assume 
that depositors are completely insured. Expected profits when bank i 
chooses to invest in the prudent and the gambling asset, respectively 
are: 
irC(n,r-i) = (a(l + k)-ri)I>(ri,r_i), 
Trfiri.r-i) = |(7(H-fc)-ri)I>(ri,r_i). 
From the above profit functions it is clear that each bank is risk 
neutral. Given that the expected return from the prudent asset is 
higher than that of the gambling asset, it might seem surprising that 
some banks might invest in the gambling asset. Here the assumption 
of 7 > a plays a crucial role. First thing to note is that if a bank 
invests in the gambling asset and the gamble fails then, due to limited 
liability, the bank does not have to pay back its depositors. It is well 
known that risk neutrality plus limited liability is equivalent to risk 
loving. By this argument a bank gambles since the return is very high 
when the gamble pays off. This creates moral hazard at the bank level 
and sometimes causes the banks to take risks. 
3. Market Equilibrium 
In this section we analyze the equilibrium when the number of banks 
in the economy is fixed. We analyze two types of symmetric equilibria: 
a prudent equilibrium where all banks invest in the prudent asset, and 
a gambling equilibrium, where all banks invest in the gambling asset. 
2 Note that the bank could invest a fraction of its total capital in each asset, 
but this is not optimal due to risk neutrality. 60 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
The timing of events, which is summarized in figure 1, is as fol-
lows. First, banks simultaneously offer their deposit rates. Then the 
depositors choose a bank in which they place their funds. Next, banks 
make their portfolio choice. Finally, the projects are realized and de-
positors are paid off. An adequate solution concept for this model is 
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and we solve the game using backward 
induction. 
Figure 1 
Timing of Events 
t=0 
t=l 
t = 2 
t = 3 
Banks announce the rates 
' Depositors choose where to place their funds 
• Banks make their portfolio choice 
'Results and depositors are paid off 
Stage 3: Banks Make Their Portfolio Choice 
A bank i invests in the prudent asset if the expected profits of doing 
so exceed the expected profits from investing in the gambling asset 
(>f > Trf ), i.e., if the following No Gambling Condition (NGC) is 
satisfied: MARKET POWER 61 
ri <2m(l + k) =f, where m = a- -7 (NGC) 
If we reverse the above inequality, we have the Gambling Con-
dition (GC). If (GC) is satisfied, a bank invests in the gambling asset 
because it turns out to be more profitable to do so. 
Stage 2: Depositors Choose Where to Place Their Funds 
In order to make his choice, a depositor considers the rates offered 
by different banks (stage 1 of the game) and the transport cost for 
traveling to a bank. Consider a bank i. An individual at a distance 
x deposits his unit fund if n - 1 > tx. Call this restriction the 
Participation Condition (PC). If this condition is satisfied for all x 
and for all banks, all the individuals in the economy deposit. In 
this case a covered market is said to arise. Now consider any two 
banks i and i + 1 (or i - 1). If there is a depositor at a distance x 
from i (hence, at a distance ^ - x from i + 1) such that the above 
condition is reversed (i.e., a No Participation Condition (NPC) holds) 
with respect to this depositor and both the banks, then this depositor 
does not place his fund in either of the two banks. So if between 
two consecutive banks on the circle there is a non empty subset of 
individuals who do not deposit, then an uncovered market is said to 
arise. The market structure, covered or uncovered, depends on the 
individuals' decision about placing their funds. Hence, these market 
structures are endogenous. 
If we would have considered a framework without deposit insur-
ance, the banks' portfolio choice in the last stage would affect the 
depositors' decision, since in case the gamble fails they would have 
received nothing (i.e., a gambling bank inflicts an expected loss on 
its depositors). Under such framework the depositors' decision would 
not only be a function of the deposit rates offered by the banks, but 
also on the expected volume of deposits with his bank.
3 
Stage 1: Banks Announce the Deposit Rates 
In this stage, each bank chooses a deposit rate to maximize its profits. 
They maximize taking into account two restrictions ((NGC) or (GC) 
3 See Dam and Sanchez-Pages (2004) for a model without deposit insurance. 62 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
from stage 3, (PC) or (NPC) from stage 2). Hence, we have 4 pos-
sible symmetric equilibria: a Covered Prudent Equilibrium (CPE), a 
Covered Gambling Equilibrium (CGE), an Uncovered Prudent Equi-
librium (UPE) and an Uncovered Gambling Equilibrium (UGE). The 
necessary conditions for their existence are examined in the next two 
subsections. 
3.1. Covered Market 
A covered market arises when all depositors place their funds. We 
analyze two possible equilibria: a Covered Prudent Equilibrium (CPE) 
and a Covered Gambling Equilibrium (CGE). 
3.1.1. Covered Prudent Equilibrium 
In order to compute the demand, we look at the individual who is 
indifferent between depositing in bank i and in any other bank. When 
bank i offers n and all other banks offer r, a depositor is indifferent 
if n - tx = r - t (i - ar). If this indifferent depositor places his fund 
in bank i, then all other depositors between him and the bank would 
do the same. Hence, the demand for deposits of bank i is given by: 
Di{ri,T) = 2x{ri,r) = -^- + -. (1) 
There are two restrictions that must be taken into account: the 
No Gambling Condition which must be satisfied for all banks to make 
sure that the equilibrium is indeed prudent and the Participation 
Constraint which guarantees that there is no depositor who has in-
centives not to place his fund, and that hence the market will be 
covered. Since we look at symmetric deposit rates at equilibrium, it 
is sufficient to check the participation constraint for the individual 
who is at the same distance from two neighboring banks (i.e., at a 
distance l/2n from each bank). Hence, (PC) for bank i implies the 
following: 
n > l + (PC) 
2n 
Thus, in this stage bank i solves the following problem: 
max {(a(l + k) - n) f + 1J j , MARKET POWER 63 
subjetto (NGC) and (PC). 
Denote by r
c
p the candidate optimum in a symmetric equilib-
rium. Using the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions, we obtain the 
following candidate optima: 
if, if i<a(l + *)-r, 
r
c
p = { a(l + k) - i if a(l + Jb) - r < i < §(a(l + fc) - 1), 
+ if §(a(l + k) - 1) < I < 2(r - 1). 
In order to make things more interesting we assume that 
a(l + fe)-r< |(a(l + fc)-l)<2(r-l). 
Notice that we have one interior and two corner solutions. First 
analyze the corner solution f. This must satisfy (PC), which implies 
£ < 2(r - 1). Since the profit function is strictly concave in rh at f 
this function must have a positive slope, which implies 
- < a(l + k) -r. 
n 
Hence, these two together imply that f is candidate optimum only if 
- < min{a(l +k)-f, 2(f - 1)} = a(l + k)-f. 
n 
Consider now, the interior solution a(l + k) - ±, which must satisfy 
both restrictions (NGC) and (PC). This implies 
a(l + k)-f < - < ha{l + k)-\). 
n 3 
Finally, the other corner solution 
which must satisfy (NGC) implying that i < 2(r - 1). Also, at this 
point the profit function must have a negative slope, hence we must 
have 
-> + fe) - 1). 64 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
These two together imply 
!(«(!+ *)-!)< -<2(r-l). 
3 n 
3.1.2. Covered Gambling Equilibrium 
We compute the demand for deposits of bank i when it offers n and 
all other banks offer r. Notice that we assume the depositors are 
completely insured and hence, they are paid the promised deposit 
rates no matter what the banks' portfolio choices are. Then, the 
demand for deposits will be identical to that of a prudent bank. Thus, 
the demand is given by equation (1). 
Here, there are two restrictions that must be taken into account: 
the Gambling Condition which must be satisfied for all banks to en-
sure that the equilibrium is indeed gambling and, as in the CPE, the 
Participation Constraint which guarantees a covered market. Bank i 
solves the following maximization problem: 
subjetto (GC) and (PC). 
Denote by r
C
G the candidate optimum in a symmetric equilib-
rium. Using the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions, we obtain the 
following candidate optima: 
i<7(l + *)-»
:. 
7(1 +*) -r < < 2(f- 1), 
£>2(f-l). 
Again to make things interesting we assume that 
7(1 + fc) - r < |(7(1 + fe) - 1) < 2(f - 1). 
Notice that we have one interior and two corner solutions. First 
consider the interior solution 
7(1 + *)--. 
n 
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This must satisfy both (GC) and (PC). This implies 
- < min |7(1 + k)-f, + k) - 1) | = 7(1 + Jfc) - r. 
Next examine the corner solution f. This must satisfy the (PC), 
which implies 
- < 2(r- 1). 
n 
Given the concavity of the profit function, at r, the profit function 
must have a negative slope, which implies 
- >7(l + fc) -F. 
n 
Hence, these two together imply that f is a candidate optimum only 
if 
7(l + fc)-r< -<2(r-l). 
n 
Notice that f is the deposit rate that makes a bank indifferent between 
investing in a gambling and a prudent asset. Finally, the other corner 
solution 
t 
must satisfy the (GC). This implies 
->2(r-l). 
n 
Also, at this point the profit function must have a negative slope and 
hence, one must have 
n 3 
These two together imply 
->|(7(1 + *)-l).  77, .i 
t 
— > max 
n 
|2(f- l)J(7(l + fc) - 1)J =2(r- 1). 66 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Until now, we have described the candidate optima of the bank's 
maximization problem under a covered market structure when all 
banks invest either in a prudent asset or in a gambling asset. Now, we 
analyze the uncovered market. The Nash equilibrium is characterized 
in section 3.3. 
3.2. Uncovered Market 
An uncovered market emerges when there exist at least two consecu-
tive banks in the circle between which there is a non empty subset of 
depositors who do not place their funds in either of these banks. We * 
examine two possible equilibria: an Uncovered Prudent Equilibrium 
(UPE) and an Uncovered Gambling equilibrium (UGE). 
3.2.1. Uncovered Prudent Equilibrium 
We compute the demand for deposits issued by bank i. When bank i 
offers ru a depositor at distance x will prefer to stay out of the market 
if n - 1 < tx and hence, bank i will have a maximum deposit of 
from each side. Thus, it has the following demand for deposits: 
D{n) = 
In such an equilibrium there are two restrictions that must be 
taken into account: the No Gambling Condition which makes sure 
that the equilibrium is indeed prudent and the No Participation Con-
straint which guarantees an uncovered market. Since in an equilib-
rium banks offer identical deposit rates, it is sufficient to show that 
the depositor at a distance x = ^ from a bank does not deposit in 
this bank. Thus, the No Participation Constraint reduces to: 
Hence in this stage, bank i solves the following maximization 
problem: 
(NPC) 
subjetto (NGC) and (NPC). MARKET POWER 67 
Denote by r
U
P the candidate optimum in a symmetric equilib-
rium. Using the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions, we obtain the 
following candidate optima: 
if, if 2(r-l)< £<a(l+ *)-!,  JJ p 
To analyze a non-trivial case, we assume that 
2(f-l) < a(l + *)-l. 
Solving the maximization problem in the case of uncovered market 
needs a bit more explanation. First notice that, in case of a UPE, 
the deposit rate of bank i needs to satisfy two constraints. The No 
Gambling Condition implies 
n < f, 
and the No Participation condition implies 
t 
Consider figure 2. The profit function of the bank is strictly concave 
reaching a maximum at 
= q(l + fc) + l  
T
i 2 
If we have 
t a(l + fc) + l 
r < 1+ 7T ^ 7T 
In Z 
(as depicted in this figure), then f is a candidate for the equilibrium. 
This also implies that is a candidate if 
2(f-l)< -<a(l + fe)-l. 
n 
Now suppose 
a(l + fc) + l 
< min  • /- 1 ,
 1 x 
m|r'
1+2^
}  2 68 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Then 
a(l + fc)+l 
2 
is a candidate optimum. Hence, for this we must have 
->a(l + fc)-l. 
n 
There is also the other corner solution 
If the (NPC) binds, then this is same as a Covered Prudent Equilib-
rium. Hence, in this case we call the solution r
u
p as in the CPE and 
ignore this corner solution. The same is true for a UGE. 
Figure 2 
A Case of Uncovered Prudent Equilibrium 
A MARKET POWER 69 
3.2.2. Uncovered Gambling Equilibrium 
Notice that we assume full deposit insurance and hence, the depos-
itors are paid back the promised rate no matter what the banks' 
portfolio choices are. Hence, the demands for deposit are the same 
under both gambling and prudent equilibria. Again there are two re-
strictions that must be taken into account: the Gambling Condition 
which ensures the equilibrium is indeed gambling and the No Partic-
ipation Constraint that guarantees an uncovered market. Thus, bank 
i solves the following problem: 
max |I(7(l + fc)-ri) P^)}, 
subjetto (GC) and (NPC). 
Denote by r
U
G the candidate optimum in a symmetric equilib-
rium. Using the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions, we obtain the 
following candidate optimum: 
TTn 7(l + fc) + l , t 
2 n 
Observe that we have one interior and one corner solutions. We ignore 
the corner solution r since at this rate, the profits from investing in the 
prudent asset and the gambling asset are the same. This equilibrium 
(if it exists) may be refered to as a UPE. Consider the interior solution 
7(1 + k) + 1^ which mugt satisfy botn (QC) an(j (NPC). 
This implies 
->7(l + fc)-l. 
n 
Until now, we have only described the necessary conditions for 
the existence of prudent and gambling equilibria under both market 
structures. In the next subsection, we provide a full characterization 
of equilibrium. 
3.3. Characterization of Equilibrium 
In the following proposition, we characterize the equilibrium. Recall 
£ is used as a measure of market concentration. 70 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
PROPOSITION 1. For given levels of k,t and n, there exist values of 
market concentration \G and \P such that: 
(a) if± < A
G (low market concentration), there is only a Covered 
Gambling Equilibrium with banks offering deposit rate 7(1 + k) -
(
h) »/£ e [AG.AP] (intermediate levels of market concentration), 
there is only a Covered Prudent Equilibrium with banks offering de-
posit rates a(l + k) - £ andl+j^; 
(c) if £ > A
P (very high concentration), only an Uncovered Pru-






PROOF. See Appendix. 
This proposition tells us that when market concentration is low, com-
petition makes the banks' profits so low that banks have incentives to 
invest in the gambling asset. On the other hand, when concentration 
is high, banks have high profits. So they have incentives to choose 
the prudent asset. This proposition is summarized in figure 3. 
The logic for the above results is fairly intuitive. High bank 
competition erodes banks' profit. They compete fiercely by offering 
high deposit rates. Since banks are able to choose between a gambling 
asset and a prudent asset, and limited liability makes bank behave 
like risk-lovers, a very high return (7) on gambling in case of success 
leaves little incentive for banks to behave diligently. In a dynamic 
model this is similar to the famous "charter value effect". Often it is 
argued that in a highly competitive environment banks take high risk 
since they have very little to lose ("gambling at resurrection"). On 
the other hand, with a very high market power banks offer a lower 
deposit rate with the prospect of earning higher "monopoly rent". 
Banks thus have incentives to behave prudently to preserve the rent. 
4. Entry and Social Optimum 
We have established that higher market power for banks leads to less 
risk taking. What happens to social welfare? In this section we first 
derive welfare as a function of market concentration, and then analyze 
possible policy implications that might emerge within this stylized 
framework. It will be clear immediately that welfare is always lower 
in the uncovered market. Hence, we concentrate only on the covered 
market. MARKET POWER 71 
Figure 3 
Characterization of Equilibrium 
CGE  CPE  UPE 
0  P 
First, let us compute the total welfare in case of a CPE. In any 
equilibrium welfare is the sum of banks' profit and net consumers' 
surplus minus the total cost of deposit insurance. Consider a bank i. 
The total measure of depositors going to this bank is ±. Hence, at 
any equilibrium deposit rate r, the bank's profit is 
(a(l + fc)-r)-. 
n 
The total revenue of these depositors is £. These depositors also incur 
a total transport cost of 
2t  / : 
Jo 
xdx. 
Hence, the aggregate net consumers' surplus associated with this bank 
is 
r i n r
1/2
n 
2t / : 
n n J0 
xdx. 
In a prudent equilibrium, there is no cost of deposit insurance. Hence, 







CP  n (a(l + fc)-r)- + 2t  xdx 
TI TI TI  JO 
= a(l + fc)-l-¿. 
Notice that in case of a CGE with a rate r, the total expected 
cost of deposit insurance is §. Hence, the (expected) welfare is given 
by: 
The welfare function is depicted in figure 4. One can have two 
situations. If the return on the prudent asset is relatively high, i.e., 
11a > 77, then 
On the other hand, if the return on the prudent asset is relatively 
low, i.e., 11a < 77, then 
Hence, the maximum welfare is reached at £ = 0. 
Now suppose that the public authority has the objective of max-
imizing social welfare and that this is achieved through a policy of 
entry restriction. This mechanism works as follows. If new banks 
want to enter the market or if the incumbent banks want to stay 
in the business, they have to pay a fixed entry/permanence fee of 
amount F. 
In light of figure 4a, welfare is maximized at £ = 0. Hence, the 
socially optimal number of banks is n* -> oo, and the fee charged 
is F = 0. In other words, the optimal policy is "no restriction on 
entry". Notice that at = 0 each bank earns a profit Hence 
I7(i + fe)_i__L. 
W
CG (0) < W
CG (AG). 
In this case, welfare is maximized at 
- = Xa= l^-a){l + k). 
n 2 
W
CG (0) > W
CG{\G). MARKET POWER 73 
n* -> oo implies a long run equilibrium (characterized by a zero-profit 
condition). At the maximum social welfare, all banks invest in the 
gambling asset and the depositors receive a higher deposit rate. 
On the other hand, when the return on the prudent asset is rel-
atively high (figure 4b), the welfare is maximized at i- = \G. Hence, 
the socially optimal number of banks in the market is 
7
1 \G 3(7-a)(l + fc)
-
At this level, all banks invest in the prudent asset and the depositors 
receive a lower deposit rate a(l + k) - \G. Notice that at this level 
of market concentration, each bank earn a profit equal to 
J_ _ 9((7-Q)(1 + AQ)
2 
n*
2 ~ At 
Hence, entry can be restricted to n* by charging a fee such that the 
profit is zero. Hence, F is given by: 
_ 9((7-a)(l + ifc))
2 
The above discussion is summarized in the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 2. (i) If the return on the prudent asset is relatively 
high then no restriction on entry of new banks is the socially optimal 
policy, (ii) If the return on the prudent asset is relatively low then 
welfare is maximized with a finite number of banks. The optimal policy 
is to charge a fixed fee in order to restrict entry to this level. 
Notice that the only objective of the government is the maxi-
mization of social welfare. Depending on the values of the parame-
ters, welfare is maximized at a gambling equilibrium or at a prudent 
equilibrium. In the later case, it happens that at the welfare maximiz-
ing level of market concentration gambling is completely eliminated. 
These results should be interpreted carefully, and no way should be 
confused as general conclusions regarding policy implications of mod-
els when banks have the opportunity to choose between a safe and a 
risky asset. Within the current model, part (ii) of the above proposi-
tion is true since there is a negative relationship between risk taking 
and market concentration. Yet, our findings are consistent with the 
"last bank standing" effect of Perotti and Suarez, they assert: 74  ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Figure 4 
a) Welfare when 11 a > 77 
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...Promoting the takeover of failed banks by solvent institutions results in 
greater market concentration and larger rents for the surviving incumbents.. .Entry 
policy may subsequently serve to fine-tune the trade-off between competition and 
stability... (Perotti and Suarez (2002). 
The idea is that banks' speculative behavior is often viewed as 
the result of a trade-off between short term gains from speculation 
and long term loss of franchise value. Hence, we find it appropriate 
that in the long run competition, the government (in accordance with 
the competition authority) may resort to this sort of entry policy to 
increase market concentration in the short run. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we use a model of monopolistic competition to study 
banks that compete in deposit rates. We assume that depositors are 
fully insured and we analyze the effects of market concentration on 
the risk-taking behavior of banks. Using a static model, we show 
that for very low levels of concentration, banks invest only in the 
gambling asset. We show that when the market concentration is high 
banks tend to take less risk. We also show that for very high levels 
of concentration, an uncovered market emerges where the rates are 
so low, that they do not compensate for the increased transport cost. 
We also show that social welfare can be maximized with free entry or 
with a entry restriction imposed by the public authority. 
The policy recommendation is much confined to the specifica-
tions of this very stylized model, and should no way be confused as 
being the only policy to make banks behave prudently. Among sev-
eral others, a risk-based capital requirement is also able to achieve 
similar policy goals. This method is often used by the Mexican cen-
tral bank.
4 In this paper optimal entry policy is purely determined 
by efficiency concerns, and does not incorporate many other aspects 
of the banking sector. In this regard, we even ignore agents other 
than banks and depositors. The main crux of our welfare analysis 
is the discontinuity of the welfare function with respect to market 
power. There should not be any surprise that welfare decreases with 
the degree of market concentration. The important point is the exis-
tence of multiple equilibria (namely, prudent and gambling), and one 
4 In Mexico, the market risk is calculated by using VAR approach and capital 
requirement is an increasing function of the amount of risk taken by banks. 76 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Pareto-dominates the other. The issue of entry restriction is a way to 
create more market power, which can be done in several other ways. 
One way is to allowing for bank mergers if the efficiency gains are 
high enough to offset the loss in consumers surplus.
5 
In the current model, a minimum capital requirement fails to 
fully eliminate gambling. Hence, entry restriction may lead to no 
gambling which is an optimal policy as well. One limitation of the cur-
rent model must be highlighted. We concentrate only on the deposit 
market, and abstract from credit market competition.
6 As shown 
by Boyd and De Nicolo (2004), in the presence of a credit market, 
the negative relation between risk taking and market power may be 
well reversed. In this regard, a similar policy may fail to achieve the 
desired goal of welfare maximization. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
First, we show that two candidates, f and 1 + do not survive as 
parts of an UGE. 
Consider r
C
G = r. This is a candidate when 
7(l + fc)-r< -<2(f-l). 
n 
Now, if bank i deviates with rate r* and chooses to invest in the 
prudent asset, its profit is given by: 
*?-*
P(r*, f) = (a(l + k) - r*) + ±) . 
This bank chooses r* to maximize ir
G~*
p(r*,r). Hence, r* and 
the profits with (r*,r) are given respectively by: 
, _ a(l + fc)+f t 
T 2 2n 
^p^*^ r)=i +k) - r+~y. 





i ^a(l + fc) - r + > afc + (a(l + fc) -r)-, 
^(i + jfc)-,--!^
2>0. 
The above always holds. For the deviation to be credible r* must 
satisfy the (NGC): 
r* <f 4=> - > a(l + Jfe) - f, 
n 
This holds for the interval we are analyzing. Hence, we say that 
for the values of £ in the interval 78 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
[7(l + A)-r,2(r-l)] 




G = 1 + ^. This is a candidate when £ > 
2(r- 1). Note that: 
CG I 1 , * i ,
 t \ _ UG (- t ^ t 
* \
1 + 27'





1 + 2^ J 
Ií7(l + fc)-l-i-j I. 
Thus, we can establish: 
¿(7(l + fc)-l)
2> i(7(l + fc)-l-¿) ^, 
7(1 + Jfc) - 1 ->0. 
The above always holds. Also, 
7(l + fc) + l 
2 
must satisfy the (GC) 
7(l + fc) + l 
2 
> r. 
This is satisfied for the interval we are analyzing. Thus, a bank 
deviates with rate 
7(l + fc) + l 
2 
by choosing a gambling asset. Then, we say that for 
->2(f-l), 
n 
all banks choosing a gambling asset with rate 1 + ^ can not be an 




G = 7(1 + k) - -. 
n 
This is a candidate when 
-<7(l + fe)-r. 
n 
Now, if bank i deviates with rate r* and chooses to invest in the 
prudent asset, its profits are given by: 
n 
t 
= (a(l + A) - r*) (-
 7(
1
 + fc) + 7
1 + -) . 
This bank chooses r* to maximize 
4^
P(V*,7(l + A)-£). 
Hence, r* and the profits from deviation are given respectively by: 
._(q+7)(l + A) t 
V 2 n' 






 + fc)-nJ = H 2
 + nj • 
The above deviation is profitable if: 
*?^
P (r*, 7(1 + *) " ~) > *
G f7(l + *)--, 7(1 + A) - - V 
1 /(tt-7)(l + A) t\\ t 
t\ 2 n) 2n
2' 
— — cij y- - c2 ] > 0, 80 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
where, 
(7-a)(l + fc) J (7-a)(l + ifc) 




1 + \^) 
Notice that ci > c2. Hence, the deviation is profitable if either 
L > ci or
 1 < c2. Also, r* must satisfy the (NGC), i.e., r* < f. This 
is given by? 
t (a + 7)(i + jfc) _ 3 
- > ^




It is easy to show that 
(a+7)(l + *0 _ 
c2 < r < c\. 
Thus 7(1 + k) - £ survives as a candidate if 
t 3 
- < -(7 - a)(l + fc) = AG. 
n 2 
Hence, AG is an upper bound of the Covered Gambling Equilibrium 
(CGE). 




P = a(l + k)--. 
n 
This is a candidate if 
a(l + k)-f < -< ha(l + k)-l). 
n 3 
Now, if bank i deviates with rate r* and chooses to invest in the 
gambling asset, its profits are given by: MARKET POWER 81 
This bank chooses r* to maximize 
n^
G (V>(1+ *)-£) • 
Hence, r* and the profits from deviation are given by: 
« (q+7)(l + fe) t 
V ~ 2 n' 
Now, the deviation is profitable if: 
where 
c; = |L(i+ V2)(7 _a)(i + Jfc) and c'2 = 1(1 - v^)(7 - a)(l + Jfe). 
Notice that c': > c'2. For the deviation is to be profitable we also 
need r* > r. This implies 
- < J(7-a)(l + fc). 
n 2 
It is easy to show that 
ci< |(7-a)(l + fe). 82 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Hence, r
c
p = a(l + k) - £ survives as an equilibrium rate for 
- > |(7-a)(l + fc) = AG. 
n 2 
Thus, AG is a lower bound on the CPE. 
Now consider r
c
p = r. This is a candidate when 
- < a(l + k)-f. 
n 
Now, if bank i deviates with a rate r* and chooses to invest in the 
gambling asset, its profits are given by: 
7rf^
G(rV) = |(7(1 + fc) - r*) [—j^ + 7 , 
This bank chooses r* to maximize 7rf^
G(r*,r). Hence, r* and 
the profits from this deviation are respectively given by: 
, 7(l + fc) + F í 
" " 2 27' 









1 /7(l + fc) -r i V 1 , 
27 2
 + 27 >2^
1 + fc)-' 
f7(l + ifc) -r J_V>0 
The above always holds. Also, r* must satisfy the (GC) r* > f 
which implies 
-<7(l + fc)-r. 
n 
Hence, the deviation is credible, and f does not survive as a candidate 
rate at a CPE. MARKET POWER  83 
Next, consider 
This is a candidate for 
|(a(l + *)-l)< -<2(r-l). 
3 n 
Note that for this interval, we have discarded the candidate for CGE 
with a rate f which is optimal for this interval. Another possibility is 
a rate in a UGE, but for this interval there is no optimal rate. Thus, 
deviating to another rate yields a lower profit. Hence, we can say 
that for the values of in the interval 
n 
all banks choosing the prudent asset with a rate 1 + ^ is an equilib-
rium (CPE). Notice that 1 + 4- is the marginal deposit rate between 
covered and uncovered markets. Hence, 2(f — 1) = \p is an upper 
bound on CPE. 
Finally we analyze the candidate deposit rates in an uncovered 
market. First we show that the candidate for a UGE, 
does not survive as an equilibrium candidate. This solution is opti-
mum only if 
Notice that there does not exist any gambling deposit rate with 
which a bank can deviate since the candidate deposit rate along with 
investment in the gambling asset is a dominant strategy. Another 
possible deviation is offering another deposit rate r* and choosing 
the prudent asset. We can show that a bank can profitably deviate 
with 
|(a(l + fc)-l),2(r-l) 
7(1 + fc) - 1 
2 
->7(1 + Ä)-1. 
n 
The profit with this deposit rate is given by: 84 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
and by choosing the prudent asset. The profit generated here is / 
which is higher than 
^(7(l + fc)-l)
2 for - > 7(1 + k) - 1. 
At n 
Also, for this deviation to be credible we must have r* < f. Since, 
a(l + fc)-l 
(because this is optimum in a UPE) for these values of we have 
r* < f. 
It is easy to show that there cannot be any deviation against the 
other two candidates of r
up, namely, 
q(l + fc)-l 
2 
and r since they constitute part of the dominant strategies for the 
banks. | 